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Abstract. Non-malleable codes are randomized codes that protect coded
messages against modification by functions in a tampering function class.
These codes are motivated by providing tamper resilience in applications
where a cryptographic secret is stored in a tamperable storage device
and the protection goal is to ensure that the adversary cannot benefit
from their tamperings with the device. In this paper we consider non-
malleable codes for protection of secure communication against active
physical layer adversaries. We define a class of functions that closely
model tampering of communication by adversaries who can eavesdrop
on a constant fraction of the transmitted codeword, and use this infor-
mation to select a vector of tampering functions that will be applied to a
second constant fraction of codeword components (possibly overlapping
with the first set). We derive rate bounds for non-malleable codes for this
function class and give two modular constructions. The first construc-
tion adapts and provides new analysis for an existing construction in the
new setting. The second construction uses a new approach that results
in an explicit construction of non-malleable codes. We show applications
of our results in securing message communication against active physical
layer adversaries in two settings: wiretap II with active adversaries and
Secure Message Transmission (SMT) in networks. We discuss our results
and directions for future work.
1 Introduction
Non-Malleable codes (NM-codes) [34] provide protection against active adver-
saries who can tamper with coded messages using a function from a family F , of
tampering functions. NM-codes were motivated by providing tamper resilience
in cryptographic applications such as protection of secret keys that are stored
in tamperable storage devices (e.g. smart cards) that can be subjected to phys-
ical manipulations that would affect the values of the stored secret. NM-codes
ensure the basic security requirement that the tampering (using functions from
the function class F) cannot be used to generate related cryptographic values
(e.g. a digital signature for related keys). Roughly speaking, a coding scheme
(Enc,Dec) provides non-malleability with respect to the tampering family F if
for any f ∈ F , a codeword c that encodes a message m, the decoding of f(c)
results in either the original message m, or a value m˜ that is unrelated to m,
and the probability of which of the two happens is independent of m. This
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property in the application scenario above will ensure that the tampering with
the device (stored codeword of the key) will result in either an unchanged key,
or a key that is unrelated to the original key (and hence an unrelated digital
signature). A slightly stronger notion is strong non-malleability that effectively
requires that the decoded message m˜ of a modified codeword f(c) = c˜, where
c˜ 6= c, be independent of m. NM-codes have found other applications in com-
putational cryptography, including construction of non-malleable commitment
[31,32], and domain extension for public key encryption systems [28]. NM-codes
have been studied in both information-theoretic and computational setting. In
this paper we consider information-theoretic setting.
Traditional protection goals against tampering of codewords are error correc-
tion and error detection: correction allows the original message to be recovered,
and detection allows the decoder to detect that the message has been modified.
These protections are achieved for the class of additive functions with a bound
on the number of tampered codeword components (a codeword c is tampered
to c˜ = c ⊕ e and wt(e) is bounded). NM-codes can provide protection against
much more powerful adversaries with access to much larger function families by
using randomised coding schemes and weakening the protection goal to only en-
suring that the adversary cannot benefit by manipulating a particular message.
Storage efficiency of non-malleable codes is measured by the rate of these codes,
given by the ratio of the message length to the codeword length. The highest
achievable rate of coding schemes for a function family is the capacity of the
coding scheme for the family.
The ultimate goal of NM-codes is to construct high rate codes with efficient
(computational complexity) encoding and decoding algorithms for large families
of functions. In [16] it is proved that if |F| ≤ 22
nα
, then the capacity is lower-
bounded by 1 − α. The proof uses a probabilistic construction of codes that
achieves this rate but the code obtained is inefficient ( the construction uses a
greedy algorithm). Efficient (i.e. polynomial time) non-malleable codes have been
constructed [30] when the size of the family is |F| < 2p(n) for some polynomial p.
A widely studied family of NM-codes is the bit-wise independent NM-codes that
is defined with respect to the bit-wise independent tampering family F
[n]
BIT: for
binary codewords of length n, the tampering function is represented by a vector
of n independently chosen functions (f1, · · · , fn), where fi is a binary tampering
function belonging to F
[1]
BIT = {Set0, Set1,Keep,Flip}, where Set0 and Set1 set
the value of the bit to 0 and 1, respectively, and Keep and Flip will keep and flip
the bit, respectively. Non-malleable codes for protection against (simultaneous)
independent bit-wise tampering and permutation have been proposed in [31,32].
A second widely studied function family is called C-split state model where for
a constant C, the codeword consists of C blocks, and each block is tampered
independently. A number of constructions of these codes for C = 2 in [33,8,7]
and other values of C, for example C = 10 in [11], have been proposed. All these
function families are naturally suited to the motivating scenario of protecting a
stored secret against tampering of the device, and protection approaches that
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are based on splitting the secret and storing each part on a different hardware
(with the assumption that they are not all accessible to the adversary).
In this paper we consider non-malleable codes for protection of communica-
tion against physical layer adversaries who tamper with transmitted codewords.
Physical layer security has been pioneered by Wyner [1] who showed message
transmission with perfect information-theoretic secrecy and without a shared
secret key is possible if the adversary does not have full view of the codeword.
This incomplete view may be due to the random noise in the adversary’s chan-
nel, or their limited reception and access to the codeword. In Wyner’s original
wiretap model [1] the eavesdropper’s view of the channel is partially obstructed
by the noise, and in Ozarow and Wyner’s wiretap II model [24], the eavesdropper
can select the codeword components that they want to eavesdrop, subject to an
upper bound on the number of such components. In both models the adversary
is a passive eavesdropping adversary. Our goal is to provide protection against
active physical layer adversaries that are modelled by a function family.
Our work
We study NM-codes for a class of functions that closely reflect capabilities of
physical layer adversaries. We consider adversaries who have access to directional
antennas and advanced transceivers, and can selectively read (eavesdrop) and
tamper with different parts of a codeword. The adversary can choose an index
set Sr of codeword components to eavesdrop, and an index set Sw of codeword
components to tamper with, and the tampering is bitwise (component-wise). The
choice of Sr and Sw is adaptive and for each component, taking into account all
previous choices that had been made and codeword component values accessed,
until that point. The sizes of the two sets are bounded by |Sr| ≤ nρr and
|Sw| ≤ nρw, for two constants 0 ≤ ρr, ρw ≤ 1. We model these adversaries,
when the codewords are binary, by a function family denoted by F
[n],ρr,ρw
BIT .
The size of this family depends on the actual values of ρr, ρw and is at least
(2nρw )2
nρr
, which is exponentially larger than the size of F
[n]
BIT (4
n). (This latter
class can be seen as a special case of the former when ρr = 0 and ρw = 1.)
This is because the eavesdropping set of the adversary allows them to choose
their tampering functions depending on the read components of the codeword.
Thus each tampering function fi will be a function of α = cSr , that is, the
read value of the codeword c on the Sr positions. We obtain rate bounds and
give constructions for this class of functions. We also give applications of our
results in two types of communication settings: a wiretap II channel with active
adversaries and secure message transmission in networks.
Rate bounds. Storage efficiency of NM-codes for a function family is measured
using the rate of the codes for the family. We give two sets of results, depending
on the non-malleability notion. For strong non-malleability, we prove capacity of
non-malleable codes with respect to F
[n],ρr ,ρw
BIT is 1−ρr. The proof is by deriving
an upper bound and a lower bound on the rate of these codes. The proof of the
upper bound (Lemma 3) is by proving that strong non-malleability with respect
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to F
[n],ρr ,ρw
BIT implies indistinguishibility security of the code against an adversary
who can eavesdrop ρr fraction of codeword components (wiretap II adversary),
and then using rate upper bound of wiretap II codes for this adversary to obtain
the upper bound for NM-codes. The lower bound uses [16, Theorem 3.1] and
reduces to finding an upper bound on the number of functions in F
[n],ρr,ρw
BIT .
For (default) non-malleability, we prove that if ρr ≤ ρw, the capacity of the
coding scheme is 1−ρr. The rate lower bound follows from the rate lower bound
for strong non-malleability, as it is proved [34, Theorem 3.1] that the latter codes
also provide default non-malleability. To prove the upper bound we build on a
result from [16, Theorem 5.3] that was proved for the C-split state model. Our
proof requires ρr ≤ ρw. When ρr > ρw, we show that the rate of NM-codes with
respect to F
[n],ρr,ρw
BIT can exceed 1 − ρr. We leave the upper bound (and hence
capacity) for this case as an open question.
Constructions.We give two constructions. The first one is based on a modular
construction that had been proposed for the function family F
[n]
BIT [34]. We con-
struct a new proof that shows that with appropriate choice of parameters, one
can obtain non-malleability against our new class of tampering functions where
the choice of the tampering functions depends on the read values. The second
construction uses a novel approach that relies on a new (not used in the context
of NM-codes) building block and using the security notion of indistinguishability
security.
Construction 1 uses an Algebraic Manipulation Detection (AMD) code [26] and a
Linear Error Correcting Secret Sharing (LECSS) [34]: the encoding of a message
m is given by LECSS(AMD(m)). AMD codes protect against additive errors
of oblivious adversaries (the codeword is not seen by the adversary). A (t, d)-
LECSS has t-uniformity (every t components is t-wise independent, and each
bit is uniformly distributed), and minimum (Hamming) distance d. To prove
non-malleability, for each function f we construct a probability distribution Df
that for all messages m, can be used to simulate the decoding of the tampered
codeword. The distribution Df is obtained by averaging a set of distributions,
one for each read value of the eavesdropped part of the codeword. We borrow
techniques from [34] and extend them to cater for the new much larger function
class. Theorem 3 shows that for F
[n],ρr,ρw
BIT function class, to achieve the level of
security that is provided by a (t, d)-LECSS for the function class F
[n]
BIT (same as
ρr = 0 and ρw = 1), we need a (t
′, d′)-LECSS with t′ = t+nρr and d
′ = (1−ρr)d.
That is we need to increase t-uniformity of LECSS to t′ = t + nρr, but the
minimum distance can be reduced. There is no known construction of LECSS
that meets the requirements of the construction in [34] or our construction, and
so it is unclear if the new set of parameters is harder (or easier) to achieve in
concrete constructions.
Construction 2 uses a novel approach to the construction of non-malleable codes
in the sense that instead of relying on the t-uniformity of LECSS, uses indistin-
guishability security of wiretap II codes. The construction uses an AMD code
and a linear wiretap II code with indistinguishability security WT: the encoding
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of a message m is given by WT(AMD(m)). Wiretap II codes are randomised
codes that provide indistinguishability security against an eavesdropping ad-
versary that can adaptively eavesdrop a fraction of codeword components. The
indistinguishability security is defined as follows: for |S| ≤ nρ, and any two
messages m0 and m1, SD(Enc(m0)S ;Enc(m1)S) ≤ ε. Theorem 4 shows that
using a wiretap II code for ρ = 1+ρr2 and security parameter ε and an AMD
code with error parameter δ, results in an NM-code with security parameter
δ + 2ǫ. An important advantage of this construction is that there are explicit
constructions for linear wiretap II codes satisfying ρ = 1+ρr2 that use cosets of
linear error correcting codes [19], and so we obtain an explicit construction of
NM-codes with respect to F
[n],ρr,ρw
BIT function class using error correcting codes
(and using efficient AMD code construction in [26] that has flexible parameters).
A by-product of this construction is an explicit construction of non-malleable
codes for F
[n]
BIT using error correcting codes. To our knowledge this is the first
and the only known direct construction of non-malleable codes for this function
family. The code exists for all n = 2h − 1 and h ≥ 5.
Applications. We motivated the function class F
[n],ρr,ρw
BIT by considering physi-
cal layer adversaries who can eavesdrop the communication and then choose their
tampering functions accordingly. The function class also models adversaries in
storage systems [26,34,14] where the storage is partially leaked to the adversary.
In the following we apply our results to two physical layer communication se-
curity scenarios that have been widely studied. Before outlining our results, we
discuss applicability of non-malleability as a protection goal in communication
security.
In the basic physical layer security setting (e.g. wiretap models), Alice wants
to send a message to Bob and protection is against an eavesdropping adversary.
Using NM-codes allows protection against active adversaries with access to a
family of tampering functions for which traditional error correction and detec-
tion is not possible. This protection is desirable in cases such as key agreement
protocols where the eavesdropper’s goal is to influence the shared key.
The protection through NM-code for securing message transmission in the
above setting however, does not allow Bob to know if the received message is
the one sent by Alice, or an unrelated one that is the result of tampering. An
interesting application of NM-codes to protection of message transmission is
against collusion attacks, where a dishonest protocol participant (Alice or Bob)
uses a helper to modify the transmitted message to a desired value. Consider
a malicious sender who sends a message m, and uses the helper to modify the
codeword during transmission so that the decoded message is a desired valuem′.
The sender does not have access to an out-of-band channel to send extra infor-
mation to the helper and the only help they can receive is defined by the class of
tampering functions that are available to the helper. Using non-malleable codes
with protection against this function family will guarantee that helper cannot
help the sender in anyway. An example of such setting is known as Terrorist
Fraud in authentication protocols [36].
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Protecting wiretap II channel against active adversaries. A (ρr, 1)-active adver-
sary wiretap II code is a coding scheme that provides (i) indistinguishability
security against ρr leakage, and (ii) non-malleability against F
[n],ρr ,1
BIT (ρw = 1).
Our results on strong non-malleability can be used to show that the secrecy
capacity1 for (ρr, 1)-active adversary wiretap II code, is 1 − ρr (Theorem 5).
Our (default) non-malleable code constructions give (explicit) constructions for
(ρr, 1)-active adversary wiretap II codes (Theorem 6). The rate of the second
construction that uses wiretap II codes (Section 4.2) is 1−ρr2 . If the wiretap II
code in the construction was to provide protection only against eavesdropping,
then it could achieve the rate 1 − ρr. Thus
1−ρr
2 is the cost of providing non-
malleability against tampering family F
[n],ρr ,ρw
BIT in addition to protection against
the eavesdropping adversary. A similar construction (different parameters) had
been used in [14] for providing detection of active adversaries in wiretap II set-
ting, when the adversary uses the eavesdropped part of the codeword to select
an offset vector that will be added to the whole codeword, and it was proved that
the achievable rate of the code is 1 − ρr. Their function family is considerably
smaller than the family F
[n],ρr,1
BIT , considered here.
Protecting communication in networks. Secure Message Transmission (SMT) in
networks that are partially controlled by a Byzantine adversary has been studied
in [5], where the network is modelled as a set of n node disjoint paths (also
called wires) that connect the sender to the receiver. The adversary is active and
controls a subset of size t of the wires. An (ε, δ)-SMT protocol guarantees that the
information leakage (indistinguishability of adversary’s view for two messages)
is bounded by ε, and reliability guarantee is given by Pr[MS 6=MR] ≤ δ, where
MS and MR are the sent and received messages, respectively. It has been proved
that SMT exists only if n ≥ 2t+1 [20]. We define (ε, δ)-NM-SMT for a network
adversary whose tampering capability is defined by a function class F , and
require indistinguishability privacy and reliability in terms of non-malleability,
against this adversary. Our construction in Section 5.2 is for F defined as follows.
Let wi denote the transcript of the i
th wire, and let wi ∈ W for all i. The
adversary adaptively chooses a set S ⊂ [n] of t wires, eavesdrop and arbitrarily
tampers with them. The adversary also uses the values of the eavesdropped wires
in S to tamper with the remaining [n]\S wires, each by either replacing wi with
a chosen constant ai ∈ W , or choosing a constant ai ∈ W and adding it to wi.
The function family defined by the above adversary on Wn → Wn is denoted
by F
[n],ρr,1
AO . For W = Fq we show that the construction in Section 4.2 can be
extended to q-ary alphabet, resulting in a (0, δ)-NM-SMT, where δ is the security
parameter of AMD code (Theorem 7).
Other related work.
The concept of non-malleability in cryptography was introduced by Dolev et
al. [9] and has since become a fundamental notion in cryptographic systems.
1 The highest achievable code rate satisfying (i) and (ii).
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Dziembowski el al. [34] introduced non-malleable codes in the context of tam-
per resilience and providing protection for secrets that are stored in tamperable
hardware. There is a large body of works on NM-codes including computational
NM-codes [13,6,2], and codes with extra properties such as continuously tam-
pering models [29,37,28], locally decodable/updatable [4,22], and block-wise [23]
that are not directly related to our work. In particular, leakage resilient NM-
codes [13] consider a tampering family for non-malleability and a different leak-
age family for leakage resilience. In our model of NM-codes, there is only one
family of functions F
[n],ρr,ρw
BIT and the goal is non-malleability only. Bound on the
rate of non-malleable codes was first studied in [16]. Authors present a general
lower bound for any family of tampering functions that only depends on the
size of the family, and an upper bound for a family of tampering functions that
arbitrarily act on a subset S ⊂ [n] of codeword components. A tampering class
with apparent similarity with our work is [18,10]. This function class Localℓo
consists of functions f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n where each output bit depends on at
most ℓo(n) input bits. The tampering functions in F
[n],ρr,ρw
BIT are vector of bit
tampering functions where each bit function depends on a subset of size nρr of
read components of the vector. That is unlike the function class Localℓo where
each output bit is determined by a subset of input bits, in F
[n],ρr,ρw
BIT a subset of
components of the input codeword determines the vector of functions that will
then be applied to the whole codeword.
Non-malleable code constructions for F
[n]
BIT include, the first construction in
[34], the first capacity-achieving construction [17], capacity-achieving and addi-
tionally non-malleable against permutation [32], capacity-achieving and linear
time encode/decode [27]. Explicit constructions of information-theoretic C-split
state include 2-split state with one-bit message [33], multi-bit message [8], con-
stant rate [7] and 10-split state [11]. Non-malleable codes for non-binary al-
phabets are considered in [27] and constructions of linear-time encode/decode
non-malleable codes with respect to a tampering class F+ that similar to F
[n]
BIT
consists of a vector of independently chosen tampering functions, where each
function can be from F or an overwrite functions introduced above (referred to
as Fconst in [27]), or an identity function id. The code constructions are ℓ-fold.
2 Preliminaries
Coding schemes define the basic properties for codes that are used in this paper.
Let ⊥ denote a special symbol.
Definition 1 ([34]). A (k, n)-coding scheme consists of two functions: a ran-
domised encoding function Enc : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}n, where the randomness is
implicit, and a deterministic decoding function Dec : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}k ∪ {⊥}
such that, for each m ∈ {0, 1}k, Pr[Dec(Enc(m)) = m] = 1 (correctness), and
the probability is over the randomness of the encoding algorithm.
The rate of a (k, n)-coding scheme is the ratio kn . For a family of (k, n(k))-
coding schemes, the achievable rates of the family is the supremum of the rates
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of schemes as k grows to infinity. A tampering function for a (k, n)-coding scheme
is any function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n.
Definition 2 ([34]). Let F be a family of tampering functions. For each f ∈ F
and m ∈ {0, 1}k, define the tampering-experiment
Tamperfm =
{
x← Enc(m), x˜ = f(x), m˜ = Dec(x˜)
Output m˜,
}
.
which is a random variable over the randomness of the encoding function Enc. A
coding scheme (Enc,Dec) is non-malleable with respect to F if for each f ∈ F ,
there exists a distribution Df over the set {0, 1}k
⋃
{⊥, same∗}, such that, for all
m ∈ {0, 1}k, we have:
Tamperf
m
ε
≈
{
m˜← Df
Output m if m˜ = same∗, and m˜ otherwise;
}
(1)
and Df is efficiently samplable given oracle access to f(·). Here “
ε
≈” refers to
statistical or computational indistinguishability. In the case of statistical indis-
tinguishability, the scheme has exact-security ε if the above statistical distance
is at most ε.
The right hand side of (1), denoted by Patch(Df ,m) in [34], is a random variable
defined by the distribution Df and the message m. Using this notation, (1) can
be written as,
Tamperfm
ε
≈ Patch(Df ,m). (2)
A stronger notion of non-malleability is the following.
Definition 3 ([34]). Let F be a family of tampering functions. For each f ∈ F
and m ∈ {0, 1}k, define the tampering-experiment
StrongNMf
m
=
{
x← Enc(m), x˜ = f(x), m˜ = Dec(x˜)
Output same∗ if x˜ = x , and m˜ otherwise.
}
,
which is a random variable over the randomness of the encoding function Enc. A
coding scheme (Enc,Dec) is strongly non-malleable w.r.t. F if for any m0,m1 ∈
{0, 1}k and any f ∈ F , we have:
StrongNMfm0
ε
≈ StrongNMfm1 . (3)
It is proved [34, Theorem 3.1] that strong non-malleability implies (default)
non-malleability. The (default) non-malleability however is strictly weaker than
strong non-malleability and does not imply strong non-malleability.
We will use the following coding schemes in our constructions in Section 4.
Definition 4 ([26]). Let (AMDenc,AMDdec) be a coding scheme with AMDenc :
{0, 1}k → {0, 1}n. We say that (AMDenc,AMDdec) is a δ-secure Algebraic
Manipulation Detection (AMD) code if for all m ∈ {0, 1}k and all non-zero
∆ ∈ {0, 1}n, we have Pr[AMDdec(AMDenc(m) + ∆) /∈ {m,⊥}] ≤ δ, where the
probability is over the randomness of the encoding.
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Efficient AMD codes can be constructed using polynomials over finite fields.
Lemma 1 ([26]). There exists an AMD code (AMDenc,AMDdec) with encoder
AMDenc : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}k+2u that satisfies Pr[AMDdec(AMDenc(m) + ∆) 6=
⊥] ≤ (k/u+ 1)/2u.
Note that the AMD code constructed in Lemma 1 is in fact a tamper detection
code [37], which requires that a tampered codeword is always decoded to ⊥.
We say an AMD code achieves δ-tamper detection security if for all ∆ 6= 0n,
Pr[AMDdec(AMDenc(m) +∆) 6= ⊥] ≤ δ.
The first construction of NM-codes with respect to F
[n]
BIT in [34] uses the
following Linear Error-Correcting Secret Sharing (LECSS) scheme.
Definition 5 ([34]). Let (LECSSenc, LECSSdec) be a coding scheme with mes-
sages m ∈ {0, 1}k and codewords x ∈ {0, 1}n. We say that the scheme is a
(d, t)-LECSS if the following properties hold:
– Linearity: For all x ∈ {0, 1}n such that LECSSdec(x) 6= ⊥, and for all x′ ∈
{0, 1}n, we have
LECSSdec(x+x′) =
{
⊥ , if LECSSdec(x′) = ⊥;
LECSSdec(x) + LECSSdec(x′) , otherwise.
– d-distance: For all non-zero x˜ ∈ {0, 1}n with Hamming weight less than d,
we have LECSSdec(x˜) = ⊥.
– t-uniform: For any fixed m ∈ {0, 1}k, we define the random variables X =
(X1, · · · , Xn) = LECSSenc(m), where Xi denotes the bit of X in position i
and randomness is from the encoding algorithm. Then the random variables
{Xi}1≤i≤n are individually uniform over {0, 1} and t-wise independent.
In wiretap II model [24] Alice wants to send messages to Bob over a reliable
channel that is eavesdropped by an adversary, Eve, who for a codeword of length
n, is allowed to choose any subset of size ρn of the codeword components for
eavesdropping.
Definition 6. A (ρ, ε)-Wiretap II code, or (ρ, ε)-WT code for short, is a (k, n)-
(q-ary) coding scheme that satisfies the following privacy property. For any
m0,m1 ∈ Fkq , any S ⊂ [n] of size |S| ≤ nρ,
SD(Enc(m0)S ;Enc(m1)S) ≤ ε. (4)
A (ρ, ε)-WT code is called linear if for two vectors x0,x1 ∈ Fnq ,
Dec(x0 + x1) =
{
⊥, either Dec(x0) = ⊥ or Dec(x1) = ⊥;
Dec(x0) + Dec(x1), otherwise.
The above indistinguishability based definition of security is equivalent to
semantic security which is the strongest notion of security in cryptography.
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Lemma 2 ([24]). The rate of wiretap II code with leakage parameter ρ is upper
bounded by 1− ρ.
This bound was proved with respect to weak secrecy [24] that assume uniform
message distribution and use security measure H(M|cS), where H() is Shannon
entropy and M is the random variable associated with the message. A (t, d)-
LECSS construction can be used as a linear wiretap II code with ρ = tn and
ε = 0, however the converse is not true in general. This is because privacy
requirement of wiretap code is in terms of almost t-wise independence instead
of t-uniformity, and minimum distance of these codes can be 1. Another closely
related primitive is linear secret sharing scheme, which is usually studied over
large alphabets (share size) and requires reconstruction of message from subset
of codeword components of size above the reconstruction threshold.
3 Bit Tampering with Leakage
Our proposed tampering class is defined by two parameters (ρr, ρw). We first
define the function class, and then prove rate bounds for codes that provide
non-malleability for this class.
3.1 (ρr, ρw)BIT-NMC
Let F
[1]
BIT = {Set0, Set1,Keep,Flip} denote the set of functions that tamper
with one bit, and F
[n]
BIT denote the set of n-bit bit-wise independent tamper-
ing functions. Each f ∈ F
[n]
BIT is specified by a vector (f1, f2, · · · , fn) where
fi ∈ F
[1]
BIT. For a vector x = (x1, x2, · · · , xn) ∈ {0, 1}
n , f(x) is a vector
x˜ = (x˜1, x˜2, · · · , x˜n) ∈ {0, 1}
n, where x˜i = fi(xi), i = 1, · · · , n.
Let [n] = {1, 2, · · ·n}. We define the set F
[n],ρr,ρw
BIT as the set of bitwise tam-
pering functions where the adversary (i) adaptively selects a subset Sr ⊂ [n] of
size nρr codeword components for eavesdropping, and (ii) tampers bitwise with
a subset Sw ⊂ [n] of size nρw of codeword components, each using a function
from F
[1]
BIT. The adversary can choose any pair of subsets Sr, Sw, subject to the
bound on their sizes. Let S
[n]
ρ denote the set of subsets of size ρn of [n]. We
use S
[n]
ρr and S
[n]
ρw , with cardinality
(
n
nρr
)
and
(
n
nρw
)
, respectively. For a vector
x = (x1, x2, · · · , xn) ∈ {0, 1}n and a set S = {i1, i2 · · · i|S|} ⊂ [n], let xS denote
the subvector (xi1 , xi2 · · ·xi|S|).
Definition 7. Let x be a binary vector of length n, and xSr and xSw denote
the subvectors with components in the set Sr ⊂ [n] and Sw ⊂ [n], respectively.
The function g : {0, 1}nρr → F
[nρw]
BIT defines a vector of bit tampering functions,
dependent on a vector of length nρr (read values in xSr). For fixed Sr, Sw and g
values, the tampering function fSr,Sw,g : {0, 1}
n → {0, 1}n takes a vector x and
results in a vector x˜ = fSr,Sw,g(x) where:
x˜Sw = (g(xSr ))(xSw ) and x˜S¯w = xS¯w . (5)
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In other words, fSr,Sw,g modifies components of the input vector that are in
Sw, using the tampering functions g(xSr) and leaves the other components un-
changed. Let gxSr
def
= g(xSr) denote a vector of nρw bit tampering functions.
For a fixed (ρr, ρw) pair, we define the tampering function family,
F
[n],ρr,ρw
BIT
def
=
{
fSr,Sw,g | Sr ∈ S
[n]
ρr , Sw ∈ S
[n]
ρw , g : {0, 1}
nρr → F
[nρw]
BIT
}
. (6)
Sizes of Sr and Sw. Note that in the above definition, the sets Sr and Sw have
the exact sizes nρr and nρw, respectively. The function set however includes
all functions with |Sr| ≤ nρr and |Sw| ≤ nρw. This is because a set Sr of size
nρr − ℓ, where ℓ is an integer satisfying 1 ≤ ℓ < nρr, is a subset of a set S′r
of size nρr, where ℓ components have not been used in selecting the tampering
functions in g. Similarly, a set Sw of size nρw− ℓ, where ℓ is an integer satisfying
1 ≤ ℓ < nρw, is a subset of a set S′w of size nρw, where ℓ components are Keep
function. Thus although we focus on Sr and Sw with exact sizes nρr and nρw,
our results hold if one considers all function vectors that are determined by Sr
and Sw of any size up to the corresponding upper bounds. This is particularly
important as we use this function class for modelling physical layer adversaries,
and adversaries can choose set sizes arbitrarily (up to their reading and writing
capabilities).
Special Case Example F
[n],0,1
BIT = F
[n]
BIT. It is easy to see that in F
[n],ρr,ρw
BIT ,
when ρr = 0 the adversary does not have any access to the codeword, and
ρw = 1 implies that all components of a codeword will be tampered bitwise and
independently. The function class is thus the same as F
[n]
BIT.
Subsets of F
[n],ρr,ρw
BIT for Fixed (Sr, Sw). For a fixed pair of reading index set
Sr and writing index set Sw, let,
F
[n],Sr,Sw
BIT =
{
fSr,Sw,g|g : {0, 1}
nρr → F
[nρw ]
BIT
}
. (7)
According to (6), we have:
F
[n],ρr,ρw
BIT =
⋃
Sr∈S
[n]
ρr ,Sw∈S
[n]
ρw
F
[n],Sr,Sw
BIT . (8)
Definition 8. A (k, n)-coding scheme is called a (ρr, ρw)BIT-Non-Malleable Code
((ρr, ρw)BIT-NMC) if it is a non-malleable coding scheme with respect to F
[n],ρr,ρw
BIT .
3.2 Rate Bounds for (ρr, ρw)BIT-NMC
The highest achievable rate of coding schemes for the function family F
[n],ρr,ρw
BIT
is the capacity of the coding scheme for this family. We provide rate results for
the two notions of non-malleability.
Strong non-malleability. This stronger notion puts more stringent require-
ment on the code and allows us to characterise the capacity for the F
[n],ρr,ρw
BIT
function family.
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Theorem 1. The capacity of strong (ρr, ρw)BIT-NMC is 1− ρr.
The proof of this theorem uses a theorem in [16] and Lemma 3 below, to derive a
lower bound and an upper bound on the achievable rates of the coding schemes,
respectively. We include the theorem for completeness.
(Theorem 3.1, [16]). Let F be any family of tampering functions from n-bit to
n-bit. There exists a construction parameterized by T and δ, such that for any
ε, η > 0, with probability at least 1 − η, the (k, n)-coding scheme obtained is a
strong non-malleable code with respect to F with exact security ε and relative
distance δ, provided that both of the following conditions are satisfied.
1. T ≥ T0, for some
T0 = O
(
1
ε6
(
log
|F [n]|2n
η
))
.
2. k ≤ k0, for some
k0 ≥ n(1− h2(δ))− logT − 3 log
(
1
ε
)
−O(1),
where h2(·) denotes the binary entropy function.
Thus by choosing T = T0 and k = k0, the construction satisfies
k ≥ n(1− h2(δ))− log log
(
|F|
η
)
− logn− 9 log
(
1
ε
)
−O(1).
In particular, if |F| ≤ 22
nα
for any constant α ∈ (0, 1), the rate of the code can
be made arbitrarily close to 1− h2(δ)− α while allowing ε = 2−Ω(n).
The following lemma relates strong non-malleability with respect to F
[n],ρr,ρw
BIT ,
to indistinguishability security of (ρr, ε)-wiretap II codes.
Lemma 3. If a coding scheme is strongly non-malleable with respect to F
[n],ρr,ρw
BIT
with exact security ε, then it is a (ρr, ε)-WT code.
Proof. Proof is by contradiction: we show that if a strongly non-malleable coding
scheme with respect to F
[n],ρr,ρw
BIT does not satisfy wiretap II indistinguishability
security, then we can construct a tampering function that violates the strong
non-malleability property of the coding scheme.
Assume a strongly non-malleable coding scheme with respect to F
[n],ρr,ρw
BIT
does not satisfy wiretap II indistinguishability security. Then, there exists a
reading set Sr ⊂ [n] of size |Sr| = nρr, and a pair of messagesm0,m1 such that
SD(Enc(m0)Sr ;Enc(m1)Sr) > ε.
By the definition of statistical distance, there exists a set Dε ⊂ {0, 1}nρr such
that
|Pr[Enc(m0)Sr ∈ Dε]− Pr[Enc(m1)Sr ∈ Dε]| > ε.
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Now consider a tampering function fSr,{1},g, that reads the codeword compo-
nents in Sr positions, and tampers with the first bit of the codeword based on
the read value. We define g : {0, 1}nρr → {Set0, Set1,Keep,Flip} using the set
Dε as follows.
g(α) =
{
Keep, α ∈ Dε;
Flip, otherwise.
Note that fSr,{1},g when applied to a codeword in c, will leave it unchanged if
cSr ∈ Dε, and flips its first component otherwise.
According to Definition 3, we should have
|Pr[StrongNM
f
Sr,{1},g
Dε
m0 = same
∗]− Pr[StrongNM
f
Sr,{1},g
Dε
m1 = same
∗]| > ε.
This leads to
SD(StrongNM
fSr,{1},g
m0 ; StrongNM
f
Sr,{1},g
Dε
m1 ) > ε,
which contradicts the strong non-malleability of the coding scheme. ⊓⊔
We use the above two results leads to the following proof.
Proof (of Theorem 1). Theorem 3.1 in [16] shows that for any function family
F of size upper bounded by |F| ≤ 22
nα
, there is a family of coding schemes that
can achieve the rate 1−α arbitrarily close, by using sufficiently long codes (e.g.
let δ = 1n ). To use this theorem to find a lower bound on the achievable rate of
F
[n],Sr,Sw
BIT , we need to upper bound the number of functions in the family. We
note that the representation in (7) may not be unique for a function in F
[n],Sr,Sw
BIT .
In particular, when Sr
⋂
Sw 6= ∅, it is possible to have fSr,Sw,g′ = fSr,Sw,g′′ for
g′ 6= g′′. For example, let Sr = Sw = {i}. Then two functions g′ and g′′ from the
set {g : {0, 1} → {Set0, Set1,Flip,Keep}}, given by (g′(xi = 0) = Set1; g′(xi =
1) = Set0, and (g′′(xi = 0) = Flip; g
′′(xi = 1) = Flip), will represent the same
function in F
[n],Sr,Sw
BIT . We however only requires an upperbound on the number
of functions. Using (8) it is easy to see that |F
[n],ρr,ρw
BIT | ≤
(
n
nρr
)(
n
nρw
)
(4nρw )2
nρr
.
From the above computation, we have
log log |F
[n],ρr,ρw
BIT | ≤ 2(logn+ log logn) + nρr + log(nρw) + 1
≤ n(ρr + ξ),
where ξ is an arbitrarily small constant and the inequality holds for large enough
n. Theorem 3.1 in [16] shows that for any tampering family F that satisfies
log log |F| ≤ nα, there is a coding scheme with rate arbitrarily close to 1 − α.
Thus the achievable rate of (ρr, ρw)BIT-NMC with strong non-malleability is
lower bounded by 1− ρr.
The upper bound on the rate of these codes follows from Lemma 3 that
implies that the rate of a coding scheme with strong non-malleability for function
family F
[n],ρr,ρw
BIT , cannot exceed the rate of wiretap II codes of length n and with
leakage parameter ρr, and noting that the upper bound on the rate of these latter
codes is 1− ρr (see Lemma 2). ⊓⊔
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Default non-malleability. For (default) non-malleability, we have a general
lower bound. But the upper bound (and so capacity) is only known for ρr ≤ ρw.
Theorem 2. The capacity of (ρr, ρw)BIT-NMC for ρr ≤ ρw is 1− ρr.
The rate lower bound in the case of (default) non-malleability follows from
the lower bound on strong non-malleability codes for the same function class, and
noting that a coding scheme that provides strong non-malleability also provides
default non-malleability ([34, Theorem 3.1]). To prove a rate upper bound for
default non-malleability we use the following theorem.
(Theorem 5.3, [16]). Let S ⊂ [n] be of size ρn and consider the family of
tampering functions that only acts on the coordinate positions in S. Then, there
is a ξ0 = O(
log n
n ) such that the following holds. Let (Enc,Dec) be any (k, n)-
coding scheme which is non-malleable for the family and achieves rate 1− ρ+ ξ,
for any ξ ∈ [ξ0, ρ] and error ε. Then ε ≥
ξ
16ρ . In particular, when ρ and ξ are
absolute constants, ε = Ω(1).
Proof (of Theorem 2). The lower bound 1 − ρr for strong (ρr, ρw)BIT-NMC is
also a lower bound for (ρr, ρw)BIT-NMC.
In the rest of the proof we show that 1 − ρr is also an upper bound when
Sw ⊂ Sr. Theorem 5.3 in [16] shows that 1−
|S|
n is a rate upper bound for non-
malleable codes with respect to the family of tampering functions that only act
on the coordinate positions in S ⊂ [n]. We first show that the set of functions
considered in this theorem is the same as the set F
[n],S,S
BIT . Towards this goal,
we first show that the size of the two sets are the same. The total number of
functions that arbitrarily tamper with coordinate positions in S is (2nρ)2
nρ
. On
the other hand, the set F
[n],S,S
BIT contains the subset of functions
| {fS,S,g|g : {0, 1}
nρ → {Set0, Set1}nρ} | = (2nρ)2
nρ
.
Note that each function in the above description is distinct because tampering
of each codeword component in S can be done in one of the two ways. Thus,
|F
[n],S,S
BIT | ≥ (2
nρ)2
nρ
. Noting that the set F
[n],S,S
BIT is a subset of all functions that
tamper with the coordinate positions in S, we conclude that the two sets have
the same size and contain the same functions. The rate upper bound of 1 − ρr
for (ρr, ρw)BIT-NMC follows from Theorem 5.3 in [16] because, when ρr ≤ ρw,
there exists an S ⊂ [n] of size nρr where F
[n],S,S
BIT ⊂ F
[n],ρr,ρw
BIT , and for this subset
of functions, the upperbound holds. ⊓⊔
Remark 1. The proof of Theorem 2 requires ρr ≤ ρw. For ρr > ρw, the rate
lower bound 1− ρr remains valid but the upper bound is an open question. It is
interesting to note that capacity in this case can be higher than 1 − ρr. This is
because for small values of ρw, error correcting codes with non-zero rate exists
and in the case of error correcting codes ρr = 1 which using 1− ρr = 0, suggests
zero rate for NM-codes. This is however not true because error correcting codes
are non-malleable and in this case have non-zero rate.
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4 Code Constructions
Using the results in [37], one can construct NM-codes for tampering family (in-
cluding F
[n],ρr,ρw
BIT family) in the Common Reference String (CRS) model. We
construct explicit and efficient (ρr, ρw)BIT-NMC without any setup conditions.
Our first construction is based on a construction proposed by Dziembowski,
Pietrzak and Wichs [34] for the set of Bit-wise Independent Tampering (BIT)
functions (F
[n]
BIT in our notation). This construction has inspired a number of
other NM-code constructions [31], [17], [18] and more recently [27], [28]. The
construction uses two coding schemes: an AMD (Algebraic Manipulation De-
tection, see Definition 4) code and a LECSS (Linear Error Correcting Secret
Sharing, see Definition 5) with appropriate parameters. Explicit construction of
LECSS with the required parameters has been an open question. Our second
construction uses a linear wiretap II code and an AMD code.
4.1 Construction 1: LECSS◦AMD
We consider the function class F
[n],ρr,ρw
BIT with size at least (2
nρw )2
nρr
, which is
much larger than F
[n]
BIT (of size 4
n) that was considered in [34].
Theorem 3. Let (LECSSenc, LECSSdec) be a (d′, t′)-LECSS with an encoder
LECSSenc : {0, 1}ℓ → {0, 1}n. Let (AMDenc,AMDdec) be an AMD code from
{0, 1}k to {0, 1}ℓ with δ-tamper detection security. Let (Enc,Dec) be defined as
follows. {
Enc(m) = LECSSenc(AMDenc(m))
Dec(x) = AMDdec(LECSSdec(x))
(9)
Then the (k, n)-coding scheme (Enc,Dec) is a (ρr, 1)BIT-NMC with exact security
max{δ, 2−Ω(t
′−nρr)}, if t′ > nρr and d′ >
n(1−ρr)
4 .
Compared to Theorem 4.1 in [34], the result implies that for the same security
level, one needs to use LECSS with higher uniformity parameter (t′ = t+ nρr)
but the minimum distance of the LECSS can be somewhat relaxed. The intuition
of the proof is as follows. We need to show that for an arbitrary function fSr,[n],g
there is a distribution DfSr,[n],g that satisfies (2) for any message m. For a func-
tion with read index set Sr, the set of codewords corresponding to the message
m can be partitioned into subsets Cα consisting of codewords c where cSr = α
and α ∈ {0, 1}nρr . For all codewords in Cα the function gα
def
= g(α) ∈ F
[n]
BIT will
be used. By choosing appropriate parameters for LECSS and AMD code, we
can construct distribution DfSr,[n],g which is the “average” of the distributions
D
fSr,[n],g
α corresponding to Cα.
Proof. Consider a message m ∈ {0, 1}k, and a tampering function fSr,[n],g ∈
F
[n],ρr,1
BIT . We define two (vector) random variables X, X˜ ∈ {0, 1}
n representing
the codeword and the tampered codeword, respectively.
m
Enc
−→ X
fSr,[n],g
−→ X˜
Dec
−→ Tamper
fSr,[n],g
m .
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The randomness of the variables Tamper
fSr,[n],g
m , X and X˜ are from the random-
ness of the encoding. Since Tamper
fSr,[n],g
m and X are correlated, we have
Pr
[
Tamper
fSr,[n],g
m = γ
]
=
∑
α∈{0,1}nρr
Pr[XSr = α] · Pr[Tamper
fSr,[n],g
m = γ|XSr = α] (10)
=
∑
α∈{0,1}nρr
1
2nρr
Pr[Tamper
fSr,[n],g
m = γ|XSr = α],
where the last equality follows from the t′-uniform property of the LECSS, and
assuming that t′ > nρr .
To construct the distribution DfSr,[n],g that satisfies (2), we start by con-
structing a set of distributions {D
fSr,[n],g
α |α ∈ {0, 1}nρr}, each over the set
{0, 1}k
⋃
{⊥}
⋃
{same∗} and satisfying
Tamper
fSr,[n],g
m,α
def
=
(
Tamper
fSr,[n],g
m |XSr = α
)
ε
≈ Patch(D
fSr,[n],g
α ,m), (11)
for ε = max{δ, 2−Ω(t
′−nρr)}. The distribution D
fSr,[n],g
α is used to simulate the
function fSr,[n],g when applied to codewords in Cα, the set of encodings c of m
that for the chosen index set Sr, have cSr = α. From (10) we have,
SD
(
Tamper
fSr,[n],g
m ;D
fSr,[n],g
)
≤ 2−nρr
∑
α
SD
(
Tamper
fSr,[n],g
m,α ,D
fSr,[n],g
α
)
,
where Tamper
fSr,[n],g
m,α is the tampering variable defined in (11). We will have
SD
(
Tamper
fSr,[n],g
m ,D
fSr,[n],g
)
≤ ǫ
because for all α we have SD
(
Tamper
fSr,[n],g
m,α ,D
fSr,[n],g
α
)
≤ ǫ.
To construct D
fSr,[n],g
α , consider X ∈ Cα, namely, assume XSr = α. Let
g(α) = gα = (gα1 , · · · , g
α
n), where g
α
i ∈ {Set0, Set1,Keep,Flip}.
Firstly, (gα(X))Sr on condition XSr = α will be constant and can be com-
puted from {gαi |i ∈ Sr} and α.
Next consider application of {gαi |i ∈ S¯r} to XS¯r . The analysis below is all
under the condition XSr = α. For all component functions in {g
α
i |i ∈ S¯r} that
are in {Set0, Set1} the values of gα(X) at these positions will be constant values
0 and 1, respectively. For all component functions in {gαi |i ∈ S¯r} that are in
{Keep,Flip} the values of gα(X) in these positions will be kept the same and
flipped, respectively. In the latter case this means that the statistical properties
of columns (Cα seen as an array of row vectors) will stay the same. Since columns
of Cα in S¯r are (t
′−nρr)-wise independent, we will have, (i) each non-overwritten
column of gα(Cα) (also as an array of row vectors) in S¯r is uniformly distributed,
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and (ii) non-overwritten columns of gα(Cα) in S¯r are jointly (t
′ − nρr)-wise
independent.
Let now
S¯r
denote the number of overwrite bit functions in {gαi |i ∈ S¯r} defined
as,
nowS¯r = |{i ∈ S¯r|g
α
i = Set0 or g
α
i = Set1}|.
The above analysis shows that nρr+n
ow
S¯r
components of gα(X) will have constant
values independent of the initial value of X, while the remaining (|S¯r| − nowS¯r )
non-overwritten components in S¯r are individually uniformly distributed, and
are jointly (t′ − nρr)-wise independent.
For gα ∈ F
[n]
BIT, the difference function ∆g
α ∈ F
[n]
BIT is defined as:
∆gα(x) = gα(x) ⊕ x. (12)
Using (12) it can be seen that if gαi ∈ {Set0, Set1}, then ∆g
α
i ∈ {Keep,Flip}, and
if gαi ∈ {Keep,Flip}, then ∆g
α
i ∈ {Set0, Set1}. Thus applying a non-overwrite
bit function in {∆gαi |i ∈ S¯r} on a column of Cα, will correspond to applying an
overwrite function of {gαi |i ∈ S¯r} on that column, and vice versa.
The distribution D
fSr,[n],g
α is constructed by considering four cases according
to the number of overwrite component functions, denoted by now
S¯r
, in the set
S¯r. In the following analysis, following the approach of [34, Appendix B], we
consider four cases.
1. now
S¯r
∈ [0, t′ − nρr]: rely on linearity, t′-uniform of LECSS and AMD;
2. now
S¯r
∈
(
t′ − nρr,
|S¯r|
2
]
: rely on linearity, t′-uniform and d′-distance of LECSS;
3. now
S¯r
∈
(
|S¯r|
2 , n− t
′
)
: rely on t′-uniform and d′-distance of LECSS;
4. now
S¯r
∈
[
n− t′, |S¯r|
]
: rely on t′-uniform of LECSS.
For each case we show how the distribution can be constructed. The complete
proof is given in Appendix A.
⊓⊔
Lemma 4. When ρw <
1−ρr
2 , the coding scheme (Enc,Dec) in Theorem 3 is a
(ρr, ρw)BIT-NMC with exact security max{δ, 2−Ω(t
′−nρr)}, if the (d′, t′)-LECSS
satisfies t′ > nρr and d
′ > nρw2 .
Proof. Lemma 4 is a special case of Theorem 3 when ρw is small and we have
ρw <
1−ρr
2 . Using the proof steps of this theorem leads to four cases that are
distinguished according to now
S¯r
, the number of overwrite component functions
of gα in S¯r. Note that we always have n
ow
S¯r
≤ nρw because nρw is the total
writing budget. When ρw <
1−ρr
2 , we have n
ow
S¯r
≤ nρw <
|S¯r|
2 and hence Case
3 and Case 4 in the proof above will not occur. If Case 2. occurs (i.e. when
nρw > t
′ − nρr), the range of nowS¯r is (t
′ − nρr, nρw] ( (t′ − nρr,
|S¯r|
2 ] and this
leads to the relaxation of the parameter d′ from d′ > |S¯r|4 to d
′ > nρw2 . The rest
of the argument is as before, and is given in the detailed arguments of Case 2,
given in Appendix A. ⊓⊔
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Explicit construction of LECSS that satisfies the required minimum distance
and uniformity for arbitrary security level is an open question. The probabilistic
construction in [34, Lemma C.2] could be used to estimate the achievable rate of
LECSS with the required parameters. The estimate for the original parameters
of LECSS shows positive achievable rate [34, Theorem 4.2]. The second con-
struction uses building blocks for which explicit constructions do exist. However
estimating achievable rate of these codes remain open.
4.2 Construction 2: WT◦AMD
This is a modular construction that uses a wiretap II code and an AMD code
with appropriate parameters.
Theorem 4. Let (AMDenc,AMDdec) be an AMD code from {0, 1}k to {0, 1}ℓ
with δ-tamper detection security. Let (WTenc,WTdec) be a linear (ρ, ε)-WT code
with encoder WTenc : {0, 1}ℓ → {0, 1}n. Let (Enc,Dec) be defined as follows.{
Enc(m) = WTenc(AMDenc(m));
Dec(x) = AMDdec(WTdec(x)).
(13)
Then the (k, n)-coding scheme (Enc,Dec) is a (ρr, 1)BIT-NMC with exact security
2ε+ δ, if ρ ≥ 1+ρr2 . The rate of the NM-code is upper bounded by 1− ρ.
Proof. We use the approach of Theorem 3 and express Tamper
fSr,[n],g
m as in
expression (10). We thus need to find distribution D
fSr,[n],g
α (independent of the
message m) that corresponds to each
Tamper
fSr,[n],g
m,α =
(
Tamper
fSr,[n],g
m |XSr = α
)
.
The proof however, replaces t-uniformity in LECSS with t-privacy in wiretap
II code which is expressed in terms of indistinguishability security. We use this
property and the linearity of the code, to show that the distributions D
fSr,[n],g
α
can be found using wiretap II encodings of 0ℓ. Define a (vector) random variable
Y = WTenc(0ℓ) and then construct the distribution DfSr,[n],g as follows:
Pr
[
DfSr,[n],g = γ
]
=
∑
α∈{0,1}nρr
Pr[YSr = α] · Pr[D
fSr,[n],g
α = γ].
We use the following notations. Let X = Enc(m) and Xα = (X|XSr = α).
The tampered version is given by X˜α = fSr,[n],g(X
α) = gα(Xα), where gα =
g(α) ∈ F
[n]
BIT and g
α = (gα1 , · · · , g
α
n). Since X
α
Sr
= α, then X˜αSr is a constant.
Components of X˜α
S¯r
can be constant or random bits, depending on the corre-
sponding components gαi , i ∈ S¯r. We consider two cases that are distinguished
by the number now
S¯r
of overwrite bit functions in {gαi |i ∈ S¯r}.
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1. “At most half of S¯r are overwrite functions” (n
ow
S¯r
≤ |S¯r|2 ):
The difference function ∆gα (i.e. gα(x) = x ⊕ ∆gα(x)) has at most half
non-overwrite bit functions over S¯r. Let S be the index set of the non-
overwrite components of ∆gα in S¯r. Then |S| ≤
|S¯r|
2 =
n(1−ρr)
2 and hence
|Sr
⋃
S|
n ≤
1+ρr
2 . We use the short hand Y
α = (Y|YSr = α) (similar to
Xα = (X|XSr = α)). Then according to the indistinguishability privacy of
the (1+ρr2 , ε)-WT code, we have
SD(XαS ;Y
α
S) ≤ SD(XSr
⋃
S ;YSr
⋃
S) ≤ ε. (14)
Define the following distribution using fSr,[n],g and α.
D
fSr,[n],g
α
def
=
{
y← Yα
Output same∗, if ∆gα(y) = 0n;⊥, otherwise.
In order to show that the real tampering experiment
Tamper
fSr,[n],g
m,α = AMDdec(AMDenc(m)⊕WTdec(∆g
α(Xα)))
is close to its simulation Patch(D
fSr,[n],g
α ,m), we use the intermediate vari-
able
T′ = AMDdec(AMDenc(m)⊕WTdec(∆gα(Yα))).
Now,
SD(Tamper
fSr,[n],g
m,α ; Patch(D
fSr,[n],g
α ,m))
≤ SD(Tamper
fSr,[n],g
m,α ;T′) + SD(T′; Patch(D
fSr,[n],g
α ,m))
(i)
≤ SD(XαS ;Y
α
S) + SD(T
′; Patch(D
fSr,[n],g
α ,m))
(ii)
≤ ε+ SD(T′; Patch(D
fSr,[n],g
α ,m))
(iii)
≤ ε+ δ,
where inequality (i) follows from the fact that Tamper
fSr,[n],g
m,α and T′ are only
different at Xα and Yα, inequality (ii) follows from (14) and inequality (iii)
follows from the fact that T′ and Patch(D
fSr,[n],g
α ,m) have different values
only when ∆gα(Yα) 6= 0n and T′ 6= ⊥, which happens with probability at
most δ according to the δ-tamper detection security of the AMD code.
2. “More than half of S¯r are overwrite functions” (n
ow
S¯r
> |S¯r|2 ):
In this case, let S be the index set of the non-overwrite components of
gα in S¯r. From the assumption, we have |S| <
|S¯r|
2 and (14) holds. Let
D
fSr,[n],g
α be the distribution of the random variable Dec(gα(Yα)). Note that
Tamperf
m,α = Dec(g
α(Xα)). We need to show these two random variables
are close.
SD(Dec(gα(Xα));Dec(gα(Yα))) ≤ SD(XαS ;Y
α
S) ≤ ε,
where the first inequality follows because (gα(Xα))S¯ = (g
α(Yα))S¯ and the
second inequality follows from (14).
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To bound the exact security of the NM-code, we define an intermediate dis-
tribution D′fSr,[n],g that (unlike DfSr,[n],g) depends on message m.
Pr
[
D′
fSr,[n],g = γ
]
=
∑
α∈{0,1}nρr
Pr[XSr = α] · Pr[D
fSr,[n],g
α = γ].
Let M˜′ = Patch(D′fSr,[n],g ,m) and M˜ = Patch(DfSr,[n],g ,m). We compute
SD(Tamper
fSr,[n],g
m ; M˜) ≤ SD(Tamper
fSr,[n],g
m ; M˜′) + SD(M˜′; M˜)
(i)
≤ (ε+ δ) + SD(M˜′; M˜)
(ii)
≤ (ε+ δ) + ε = 2ε+ δ,
where (i) follows because Tamper
fSr,[n],g
m is written as expected value (over α)
of Tamper
fSr,[n],g
m,α according to (10) and for each α it is shown above that
SD(Tamper
fSr,[n],g
m,α ; Patch(D
fSr,[n],g
α ,m)) ≤ ε + δ; (ii) follows because M˜′ and
M˜ are defined in the same way (see D′fSr,[n],g and DfSr,[n],g) with different dis-
tributions XSr and YSr which are ε close according to privacy of wiretap II.
The rate of the coding scheme is kn <
ℓ
n , which according to Lemma 2 is
upper bounded by 1− ρ. ⊓⊔
Lemma 5. When ρw <
1−ρr
2 , the coding scheme (Enc,Dec) in Theorem 4 is a
(ρr, ρw)BIT-NMC with exact security 2ε+ δ, if ρ ≥ ρr + ρw.
Proof. This is a special case of Theorem 4 when ρw <
1−ρr
2 . In this case the
number of overwrite components can not exceed |S¯r|2 . Following the proof steps
of the theorem, the case now
S¯r
> |S¯r|2 in the proof will not occur and one only has
to make sure non-malleability is provided for now
S¯r
values in the range [0, nρw].
Let S be the index set of the non-overwrite components of ∆gα (or equivalently
the overwrite components of gα) in S¯r. We have |S| ≤ nρw and hence |Sr
⋃
S| =
|Sr| + |S| ≤ n(ρr + ρw). Now (14) will hold as long as the (ρ, ε)-WT satisfies
ρ ≥ ρr + ρw. The rest is identical to the proof above (using only Case 1). ⊓⊔
It has been proved [38] that the capacity of binary (ρ, ε)-WT codes with
indistinguishability security is 1 − ρ. It is however unknown if linear (ρ, ε)-WT
codes can achieve this rate. The rate of the resulting NM-code is at most 1− ρ,
which is less than 1 − ρr the achievable rate of (ρr, ρw)BIT-NMC. We leave
explicit construction of capacity-achieving (ρr, ρw)BIT-NMC as an open question.
Constructions of linear wiretap II codes. The construction in Theorem
4 requires a WtII code with leakage parameter ρ = 1+ρr2 ≥
1
2 . The following
explicit construction (coset coding) gives binary linear (ρ, 0)-WT codes.
Lemma 6 ([24]). Let G(n−k)×n be a generator matrix of an [n, n−k, d]-code C
with dual distance d⊥. Append k rows to G such that the obtained matrix
[
G
Gˆ
]
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is of full rank. Define the encoder WTenc : Fkq → F
n
q as follows.
WTenc(m) = [R m]
[
G
Gˆ
]
, where R
$
← Fn−kq .
The message set Fkq is in one-to-one correspondence with the cosets F
n
q /C of C
in the space Fnq . The decoder WTdec uses a parity-check matrix H of the code C
to efficiently identify the coset of the received word and output the corresponding
message. Then (WTenc,WTdec) is a linear
(
d⊥−1
n , 0
)
-WT code.
Binary linear codes with minimum distance d > n/2 exist; see for example
[19]. Instantiating C in Lemma 6 with the dual of such codes result in binary
linear (ρ, 0)-WT codes with ρ ≥ 12 .
An explicit family of (0, 1)BIT-NMC. For a [2
h − 1, 2h − 1 − h, 3]-Hamming
code, the dual code is a [2h − 1, h, 2h−1]-Simplex code and has d⊥ = 2h−1. The
WtII code can tolerate ρ = 12 with ε = 0. Using the AMD code in Lemma 1 with
this code gives a bit-wise independent non-malleable code of length 2h− 1. This
is an explicit construction of non-malleable codes for the function family F
[n]
BIT.
This code can be made linear time encoding/decoding if the AMD construction
is replaced with the linear time AMD construction in [27].
5 Applications to Communication Security
Our motivation for introducing the function family F
[n],ρr,ρw
BIT is to model physical
layer adversaries. In the following we give two applications of the NM-codes for
F
[n],ρr,ρw
BIT family in widely studied communication settings. In both cases we
only consider one round protocols.
5.1 Wiretap Channel II with Active Adversary
Wiretap II model with active adversary was first studied in [35], where the
eavesdropped and tampered components were restricted to the same set. In the
model proposed in [25] the adversary can read a fraction ρr, and add noise to a
fraction ρw, and the goal is to provide secrecy (indistinguishability) and correct
message recovery. It was proved that the rate upper bound for these codes is
1 − ρr − ρw, and so when ρr + ρw > 1, one needs to relax privacy or reliability
requirements. We consider a wiretap II model where the active adversary can
tamper with the codeword using functions in F
[n],ρr,1
BIT .
Definition 9. A (ρr, 1)-active adversary wiretap II channel is a communication
channel between Alice and Bob that is (partially) controlled by an adversary Eve
with two capabilities: Read and Write.
– Read: Eve selects a fraction ρr of the components of the codeword to read.
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– Write: Eve uses the read components to add errors to, or write over, possibly
all components of the codeword.
This is equivalent to applying a function in F
[n],ρr,1
BIT to the codeword.
Codes for this channel must provide security (indistinguishability) and non-
malleability.
Definition 10. A (ρr, 1)-active adversary wiretap II code is a coding scheme
(Enc,Dec) that guarantees the following two security properties.
– Secrecy: For any pair of messages m0 and m1, any reading set Sr ⊂ [n] of
size |Sr| ≤ nρr,
SD(Enc(m0)Sr ;Enc(m1)Sr ) ≤ ε.
– Non-malleability: (Enc,Dec) is non-malleable with respect to F
[n],ρr,1
BIT .
Capacity of a (ρr, 1)-active adversary wiretap II channel is the highest achiev-
able rate of coding schemes for this channel. Using the results in Section 3.2 we
can prove the following theorem.
Theorem 5. The capacity of (ρr, 1)-active adversary wiretap II code is 1− ρr.
Proof. We first show that a strong (ρr, 1)BIT-NMC is a (ρr, 1)-active adver-
sary wiretap II code. The secrecy property follows from Lemma 3. The non-
malleability property is satisfied because a strongly non-malleable coding scheme
is non-malleable. The lower bound 1 − ρr for strong (ρr, 1)BIT-NMC then gives
a lower bound for (ρr, 1)-active adversary wiretap II code.
The upper bound 1− ρr follows because a (ρr, 1)-active adversary wiretap II
code is a wiretap II code with leakage ρr (passive adversary). ⊓⊔
We have the following two explicit constructions of efficient (ρr, 1)-active
adversary wiretap II codes using our constructions of (ρr, ρw)BIT-NMC. Con-
structing capacity-achieving (ρr, 1)-active adversary wiretap II codes is an open
question.
Theorem 6. The constructions in Theorem 3 with t′ > nρr and d
′ > n(1−ρr)4 ,
and Theorem 4 with ρ = 1+ρr2 , each gives a (ρr, 1)-active adversary wiretap II
code.
Proof. The non-malleability property follows directly from Theorem 3 and The-
orem 4, respectively. The secrecy property follows from the t′-uniform property
of LECSS and the privacy of the (ρ, ε)-WT code due to the parameter choices
t′ > nρr and ρ =
1+ρr
2 > ρr, respectively. ⊓⊔
5.2 Secure Message Transmission in Networks
In the model of Secure Message Transmission (SMT) [5], Alice is connected to
Bob by a set of n node-disjoint network paths (also called wires). The adversary
can adaptively choose a subset of paths to eavesdrop and arbitrarily modify.
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Although the original model considered adversaries who can select possibly dis-
tinct sets of wires for listening, corrupting, and blocking, SMT problem has been
mainly studied for (t, n)-threshold adversaries who adaptively select t out of n
wires and arbitrarily modify them. In the following we only consider this model.
A 1-round (ε, δ)-SMT protocol is a coding scheme with a pair of algorithms
(SMTenc, SMTdec): SMTenc encodes a message mS in M to a codeword (also
called protocol transcript) c = (c1, · · · cn) ∈ (Fq)n where ci is sent over wire i
(referred to as wire i transcript), and SMTdec decodes the received transcripts
to mR in M∪ {⊥}, guaranteeing privacy loss (indistinguishability security) is
at most ε, and probability of error (Pr[mS 6=mR]) is bounded by δ.
It has been proved [20] that (ε, δ)-SMT protocols exist only if n ≥ 2t+1, and
this is irrespective of the number of protocol rounds. In the following our goal is
to show that one can remove this restriction if the reliability goal is reduced to
non-malleability.
We consider adversaries that tamper with the protocol transcript according
to functions in a tampering function family defined below. We consider an SMT
adversary with the following capabilities: the adversary (i) controls t = nρr
wires and (ii) tampers obliviously with all other wires by either (algebraically)
adding an offset, or setting the value to a new value (overwrite). Compared
to the traditional threshold (t, n) adversary, this new adversary has the extra
capability of tampering with all the wires also. We consider the following set of
symbol-wise independent Add and Overwrite (AO) tampering functions.
F
[n]
AO =
(
Fadd ∪ Fow
)n
,
where Fadd = {f∆(x) = x +∆|∆ ∈ Fq} denotes the set of additive tampering
functions and Fow = {fc(x) = c|c ∈ Fq} denotes the set of overwrite tampering
functions.
Relation with F
[n]
BIT. Generalisation of F
[n]
BIT from binary to q-ary alphabet
Fq, is symbol-wise independent tampering family F
[n]
SIT
def
=
(
Fall
)n
where Fall
denotes all functions from Fq to Fq. The class F
[n]
AO is a subset of F
[n]
SIT and has
size |F
[n]
AO| = (2q)
n. This is much smaller than F
[n]
SIT that is of size |F
[n]
SIT| = (q
q)n.
It is only in the special case for q = 2, we have F
[n]
AO = F
[n]
BIT.
Definition 11.
F
[n],ρr,1
AO
def
=
{
fSr,[n],g | Sr ∈ S
[n]
ρr , g : F
nρr
q → F
[n]
AO
}
, (15)
where the tampering function fSr,[n],g : F
n
q → F
n
q is given as follows: for x ∈ F
n
q ,
depending on the value of xSr , g selects a symbol-wise tampering function g(xSr )
from F
[n]
AO which is applied to x. That is,
fSr,[n],g(x) = g(xSr)(x). (16)
To simplify notations, we let gxSr
def
= g(xSr) and write g
xSr = (g
xSr
1 , · · · , g
xSr
n ),
where g
xSr
i is either an additive function or an overwrite function, for i =
1, · · · , n.
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Definition 12. A (1-round) (n,F , ε, δ)-non-malleable secure message transmis-
sion or (n,F , ε, δ)-NM-SMT is a protocol over n wires, defined by a pair of
algorithms (SMTenc, SMTdec), that for an adversary with access to corruption
strategies in F , the following properties are satisfied.
– Secrecy: For any pair of messages m0,m1 ∈M and for any adversary strat-
egy A embodied by F ,
max
m0,m1
SD(ViewA(SMTenc(m0));ViewA(SMTenc(m1))) ≤ ε,
where ViewA(·) is a random variable representing leakage.
– Non-malleability: (SMTenc, SMTdec) is non-malleable with respect to F and
with exact security δ.
Theorem 7. The construction in Theorem 4 with a (1+ρr2 , ε)-WT code over
the alphabet Fq and an AMD code with δ-tamper detection security gives a
(n,F
[n],ρr,1
AO , ε, 2ε+ δ)-NM-SMT.
Proof. The construction in Theorem 4 with the above parameter setting gives
a q-ary NM-code with respect to F
[n],ρr,1
AO . The proof relies on the properties
of difference function that will hold for functions in F
[n]
AO only (and not F
[n]
SIT).
Secrecy follows from the indistinguishability security of q-ary wiretap II code.
⊓⊔
Linear (1+ρr2 , ε)-WT codes over large alphabet can be constructed using the
coset code construction in Lemma 6 using for example a Maximum Distance
Separable (MDS) code. This gives explicit (1+ρr2 , 0)-WT codes with rate 1−
1+ρr
2 .
6 Conclusion
We proposed a family of bitwise tampering functions that were motivated by
physical layer adversaries and were specified by a pair of parameters (ρr, ρw),
defining the eavesdropping and tampering capabilities of the adversary. Allowing
the adversary to select tampering based on the eavesdropped information mod-
els powerful adversaries and results in a class of functions that is much larger
(double exponential) than the widely studied independent bit tampering class.
We defined non-malleable code with respect to this class and proved a number
of rate bounds that fully characterize capacity of codes that provide strong non-
malleability, as well as capacity of (default) non-malleable codes when ρr ≤ ρw.
We also gave two modular constructions, with the second one using wiretap II
codes that, using coset code construction of these codes, effectively constructs
NM-codes from linear error correcting codes and AMD codes.
There are many open questions and directions for future research. We left
tight upper bound and capacity of (default) NM-codes when ρw < ρr, as an
open problem. Also none of our construction are capacity achieving, and so
construction of capacity achieving codes remains open.
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Our main results are for binary codes. However in SMT setting, transcripts
of wires are q-ary values. Extending the results for F
[n],ρr,ρw
BIT to q-ary case,
strengthens our current NM-SMT construction for function class F
[n],ρr,1
AO , and
allows more powerful adversaries in network setting be tolerated. Our explicit
construction for NM-SMT uses q-ary wiretap II codes. One can also adapt the
construction of q-ary codes in [27] to obtain secure NM-SMT. We leave this for
future work.
Non-malleability was originally motivated for providing tamper resilience in
tamperable storages. Our work is the first to consider application in well moti-
vated communication settings of wiretap II codes with active adversaries, and
secure communication in networks. Other applications of non-malleability in
communication scenarios, including modelling collusion attacks, are interesting
directions for future work. The function class F
[n],ρr,ρw
BIT assumes tampering on
the components of Sw are independent of each other, and depends on the read
values over Sr, only. A more general case is when tampering of bits in Sw are
correlated.
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Appendices
A Appendix to the proof of Theorem 3
1. now
S¯r
∈ [0, t′ − nρr]. We consider the effect of the difference function de-
fined by (12) on codewords in Cα. According to above, the number of non-
overwrite components of ∆gα in S¯r will be at most t
′ − nρr, and according
to the t′-uniform property of LECSS, these components are each uniformly
distributed, and are jointly (t′−nρr)-wise independent. This means that the
non-overwrite components of ∆gα(X) in S¯r are uniformly distributed over
{0, 1}n
ow
S¯r . The rest of the components of ∆gα(X) in S¯r are overwrite com-
ponents (correspond to non-overwrite components of gα). Thus the distribu-
tion ∆gα(X) is independent of the input (an AMD codeword AMDenc(m))
of LECSS. The third step of tampering experiment is applying the de-
coding function Dec on the tampered codeword (of the NM-code). Using
gα(x) = x⊕∆gα(x), we have
Dec (gα(X)) = Dec (X⊕∆gα(X))
= AMDdec (AMDenc(m)⊕ LECSSdec(∆gα(X))) ,
where the second equality follows from the linearity of the LECSS.
To find the distribution of the output of the tampering experiment in this
case, denoted by
(
Tamper
fSr,[n],g
m |XSr = α
)
, we note that:
– Conditioned on LECSSdec(∆gα(X)) = 0ℓ, the output of Dec is going to
be AMDdec (AMDenc(m)) =m.
– Consider LECSSdec(∆gα(X)) 6= 0ℓ. Since the distribution of ∆gα(X) is
completely determined by fSr,[n],g and α, it is independent of the ran-
domness of the AMD code. According to Lemma 1, the probability that
the AMD decoder not outputting ⊥ is at most Pr[LECSSdec(∆gα(X)) 6=
0ℓ] · δ ≤ δ.
Thus we can define the distribution D
fSr,[n],g
α as follows:
D
fSr,[n],g
α
def
=
{
z← (∆gα(X)|XSr = α)
Output same∗, if LECSSdec(z) = 0ℓ; Output ⊥, otherwise.
This distribution will be different from the tampering experiment when the
AMD decoder fails to output ⊥ for z /∈ {0ℓ,⊥}. We then have(
Tamper
fSr,[n],g
m |XSr = α
)
δ
≈ Patch(D
fSr,[n],g
α ,m).
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 29
2. now
S¯r
∈
(
t′ − nρr,
|S¯r|
2
]
. The distribution D
fSr,[n],g
α will only output ⊥, using
LECSS decoder error detection property. Firstly using the LECSS linearity,
the decoder output will depend on the result of ∆gα on a codeword (in Cα).
The given number of now
S¯r
translates into the same number of non-overwrite
for ∆gα on components in S¯r, and the rest of components being overwrite
function. The codeword components of Cα in S¯r are (t
′−nρr)-uniform, and
as said earlier non-overwrite functions do not affect a column probability
distribution, which are uniform because Cα in S¯r is (t
′ − nρr)-uniform.
If none of the vectors in the list Array(∆gα(x)|x ∈ Cα)) correspond to a
valid codeword of LECSS, the LECSS decoder output will be always ⊥. If
there is a vector ω in Array(∆gα(x)|x ∈ Cα) that corresponds to a LECSS
codeword, there will be an undetected error. Note that ω may appear more
than once in the list. Next, the distance property of LECSS (together with
(t′ − nρr)-uniform property) is utilised to claim that the density of valid
LECSS codewords in Array(∆gα(x)|x ∈ Cα) is very small. The argument
had been used in [34, Proof of Theorem 4.1, Case 3] for the function class
F
[n]
BIT, to quantify the decoder error. Authors showed that for a (t, d)-LECSS
if the minimum distance is d > n/4, the error probability is given by,
Pr[LECSSdec(∆) 6=⊥)] ≤
1
2t
+
(
t
n(d/n− 1/4)2
)t/2
, (17)
where ∆ is a vector random variable of n components, more than half but
less than n − t of which are fixed values and the rest of components are
t-uniform.
We use the same argument and make the following adjustments. Firstly,
the tampering functions are applied to Cα and so the tampered words
Array(∆gα(x)|x ∈ Cα) will have fixed values on index set Sr. So the part
of components that can be different (between two vectors in the list) are in
S¯r. For our proof we consider S¯r. Thus we only need d
′ > (n− nρr)/4. Also
the non-overwrite components of Array(∆gα(x)|x ∈ Cα) in S¯r are (t′−ρrn)-
uniform and so we have,
Pr [LECSSdec (∆gα(X)) 6= ⊥|XSr = α] ≤
1
2t′−nρr
+
(
t′ − nρr
n(d
′
n −
1−ρr
4 )
2
) t′−nρr
2
.
(18)
3. now
S¯r
∈
(
|S¯r|
2 , n− t
′
)
. The distribution D
fSr,[n],g
α will only output ⊥, using
LECSS decoder error detection property. We study Array(gα(x)|x ∈ Cα), the
list of tampered codewords, and bound the probability of LECSS decoder
cannot detect the error. The argument is similar to above. This corresponds
to Case 4 in the proof of Theorem 4.1 in [34]. Using the required adjustment
as outlined above, we will have
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Pr [LECSSdec (gα(X)) 6= ⊥|XSr = α] ≤
1
2t′−nρr
+
(
t′ − nρr
n(d
′
n −
1−ρr
4 )
2
) t′−nρr
2
.
(19)
(It is worth noting that the argument in the above two cases use two dif-
ferent sets ( Array(∆gα(x)|x ∈ Cα) and Array(gα(x)|x ∈ Cα)) that have the
property that overwrite components in one, corresponds to non-overwrite
component in the other. The choice of the list is to allow many overwrite
components and minimise the d′-distance requirement.)
4. now
S¯r
∈
[
n− t′, |S¯r|
]
.
This is the case that most of the codeword is overwritten, and non-overwritten
part is uniformly distributed. This is because less than t′ components are
not overwritten, and the set of vectors C˜α is t
′− nρr-uniform. Thus the dis-
tribution is independent of m, and the decoder output distribution will have
the same property also. The distribution D
fSr,[n],g
α in this case is defined as
follows:
D
fSr,[n],g
α
def
=
{
z← gα(Y)
Output Dec(z)
Since the simulation and the tampering experiment are identical in this case,(
Tamper
fSr,[n],g
m |XSr = α
)
≡ Patch(D
fSr,[n],g
α ,m).
